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ABSTRACT
Taking issue with the largely ahistorical and aprocessual character of much organizational
theorizing, and following calls for ‘building path-oriented organization research on a rigorous
path theory’ (Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch, 2005: 2), I argue for knowing the organizational
as an ongoing process.

Through the contributions of path dependence theory, and with

Ireland’s Industrial Development Authority (IDA) as empirical focus, this paper will also
seek to address: the historicity and evolution of the organizational; the role of initial, external
conditions on the emergence and subsequent development of the organizational; the
dynamics of path building and the development of path dependency; and processes and
process patterns that are likely to vary historical persistencies or unlock path dependencies,
e.g., path-breaking events.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses calls for ‘building path-oriented organization research on a rigorous
path theory’ (Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch, 2005: 2), along with calls for more processual
and historically informed organizational theorizing (e.g., Booth and Rowlinson, 2006;
Burrell, 1997; Clark and Rowlinson, 2004; Jacques, 1996, 2006; Kieser, 1989, 1994;
Rowlinson and Procter, 1999; Üsdiken and Kieser, 2004; Zald, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2002).
Through the contributions of path dependence theory, and with Ireland’s Industrial
Development Authority (IDA) as empirical focus, this paper will also seek to address a
number of issues of interest to the above calls, specifically: the historicity and evolution of
the organizational; the role of initial, external conditions on the emergence and subsequent
development of the organizational; the dynamics of path building and the development of
path dependency; and processes and process patterns that are likely to vary historical
persistencies or unlock path dependencies, e.g., path-breaking events.
In taking issue with the largely ahistorical and aprocessual character of much
organizational theorizing, this paper departs from knowing the organizational by way of
classification and moves towards knowing the organizational as an ongoing process through
the lens of path dependence. Having outlined the tenets of the theory and the methodology
underpinning the research, I move on to telling a story of organizational emergence and
evolution, namely that of Ireland’s IDA.

PATH DEPENDENCE – INCORPORATING HISTORY AND PROCESS
Recognizing calls for more processual and historically informed organizational theorizing
(e.g., Booth and Rowlinson, 2006; Burrell, 1997; Clark and Rowlinson, 2004; Jacques, 1996,
2006; Kieser, 1989, 1994; Rowlinson and Procter, 1999; Üsdiken and Kieser, 2004; Zald,
1990, 1993, 1996, 2002), path dependence theory offers a way of articulating the
organizational as an ongoing dynamic over more dominant ways of thinking and knowing
that are more static (Donnelly, 2007, 2009; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2009). From its roots in
economics and an interest in the emergence of new technologies (e.g., Arthur, 1988, 1989,
1990, 1994; David, 1985, 1987, 1997, 1999, 2001), path dependence arguments have since
entered into organization studies (e.g., Araujo and Rezende, 2003; Bruggeman, 2002;
Donnelly, 2007; van Driel and Dolfsma. 2009; Greener, 2002; Noda and Collis, 2001;
Sonnenwald, 2003; Schreyögg and Sydow, 2009; Sydow and Schreyögg, 2009; Sydow,
Schreyögg and Koch, 2005, 2009).
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With an interest in how process, sequence and temporality can be best incorporated
into explanation, path dependence attempts to ‘strike a better balance between historically
insensitive causal generalization and idiographic historicism’ (Haydu, 1998: 367). Viewed as
an idea through which ‘history’ is commonly made visible, the path dependence approach
holds that a historical path of choices has the character of an irreversible branching process
with a self-reinforcing dynamic in which positive feedback increases, while at the same time
the costs of reversing previous decisions increase, and the scope for reversing them narrows
sequentially, as the development proceeds. Thus, preceding steps in a particular direction
induce further movement in the same direction ‘because the relative benefits of the current
activity compared with other possible options increase over time’ (Pierson, 2000: 252,
emphasis in original), thereby making the possibility of switching to some other previously
credible alternative more difficult.
Those who are not familiar with the path dependence approach think that it is no more
than recognition that ‘history matters’.

However, the approach not only recognizes the

impact of history, but also shows that a decision-making process can exhibit self-reinforcing
dynamics, such that an evolution over time to the most efficient alternative does not
necessarily occur. In general, path dependence refers to situations in which decision-making
processes (partly) depend on prior choices and events. It recognizes that a decision is not
made in some historical and organizational void; rather, it depends on the contingent starting
point and specific course of a historical decision-making process.
Social scientists generally invoke the notion of path dependence to support a few key
claims (Pierson, 2004): specific patterns of timing and sequence matter; from initially similar
conditions, a wide array of social outcomes are often possible; large consequences may result
from relatively small or contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced, are
almost impossible to reverse; and consequently, development is often punctuated by critical
moments or junctures which shape the basic contours of social life. All of these features
contrast sharply with more familiar modes of argument and explanation, which attribute large
outcomes to large causes and emphasize the prevalence of unique, predictable outcomes, the
irrelevance of timing and sequence, and the capacity of rational actors to design and
implement optimal solutions (given their resources and constraints) to the problems that
confront them.
Accounts of how and why events develop as they do necessitate a mode of causal
logic that is grounded in time and in characteristically temporal processes (Abrams, 1982;
Aminzade, 1992). As Mahoney (2000: 511) notes, path-dependent analyses have at least
4

three defining characteristics: (1) they entail the study of causal processes that are very
sensitive to events that occur early on in an overall historical sequence; (2) given the
contingent character of these early historical events, they cannot be explained by reason of
preceding events or initial conditions; and (3) when contingent historical events occur, pathdependent sequences are reflected in essentially deterministic causal patterns.

Sydow,

Schreyögg and Koch (2005, 2009), in remodeling classical path dependence theory, elaborate
this logic into an analytic structure to focus on the emergence and evolution of organizational
paths and path dependencies, as shown in Figure 1 below. I have expanded the Sydow,
Schreyögg and Koch (2005, 2009) model to account for processes and process patterns that
vary historical persistencies or unlock path dependencies by way of a reactive process
(reaction and counter-reaction to an already existing organizational path), which I borrow
from an interpretation of Mahoney’s (2001) notion of reactive sequence.

------------------------------Insert Figure 1 about here
-------------------------------

Phase I, what Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005, 2009) refer to as the ‘preformation
phase’, is relatively open, with action not significantly restricted in scope.

Antecedent

conditions, or historical factors, define available options and shape selection processes.
These conditions characterize a wide range of action, where decisions made cannot be
predicted by past events or initial conditions. However, to a degree, antecedent conditions
are also influenced by the past (Child, 1997), in that they are influenced by historically
framed and imprinted contingency and not by wholly unrestricted choice (Schreyögg and
Sydow, 2009). Reflecting antecedent conditions, then, at least two options are open for
selection at the critical juncture, which represents the point when one option is chosen and the
dynamics of self-reinforcing processes are set into motion.
The choice is consequential because it leads to Phase II, what Sydow, Schreyögg and
Koch (2005, 2009) refer to as the ‘formation phase’: the creation of an evolving and
narrowing organizational path that, building into structural persistence, becomes increasingly
difficult to reverse over time. It is here that positive feedback or increasing returns become
active through self-reinforcing dynamics of set-up or fixed costs (when high, individuals and
organizations have a strong incentive to stay on path), learning effects (experience of an
existing path leads to higher returns from continuing use), coordination effects (benefits of a
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given path increase as others adopt the same option) and adaptive expectations (self-fulfilling
character of ‘picking the right horse’) (Arthur, 1994: 112). Thus it is that, once a specific
selection has been made, it becomes increasingly difficult with the passing of time to return
to the initial critical juncture when at least two options were still available. As noted by
Arthur (1989, 1994), increasing returns to adoption are realized not at a single point of time
but rather dynamically, such that each step along a particular organizational path produces
consequences that increase the relative attractiveness of that path for the next round.
As effects begin to accumulate, they generate a powerful cycle of self-reinforcing
activity, contributing to Phase III, what Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2005, 2009) refer to as
the ‘lock-in phase’, such that flexibility becomes severely constrained and the organizational
path is fixed and takes on a quasi-deterministic character. Schreyögg and Sydow (2009)
suggest that organizational paths, due to their social character, require a modified conception
of lock-in. Thus, instead of a fully determined lock-in, Schreyögg and Sydow (2009: 3)
argue for conceiving of lock-in ‘as a matter of degree accounting for variance in the actual
practicing of the path.’
The continued existence of an organizational path over time has the potential to
generate a reactive process, Phase IV. As suggested by the adaptation to Sydow, Schreyögg
and Koch’s (2005, 2009) model, and borrowing from Mahoney (2001), an initial challenge to
the existing organizational path sparks a process of reaction and counter-response, as patterns
put in place during critical juncture periods are resisted or supported.

Although such

resistance may not be path breaking, it can trigger an outcome or critical juncture that results
in the development of a new organizational path.

METHODOLOGY
Ireland’s IDA affords the possibility of studying a single case over an extended period of
time, namely 1949 to 1994. The analysis is based on both archival and interview material.
The archival sources include Irish parliamentary debates, articles in newspapers, annual
reports, website, government-sponsored reports/reviews, government policies and economic
programs, government department memo, legislation, and published work (e.g., articles,
books, reports, monographs) relating to the period under study.

This material is

supplemented with interview data collected from face-to-face, semi-structured interviews
with three former chief executives, whose collective experience with the IDA spans the
period 1967 to 1994.
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I was mindful that my work entailed historiography (Thies, 2002: 351) and, even
though ‘there is no such thing as a definitive account of any historical episode’ (Gaddis,
2001: 308, emphasis in original), I pursued a number of strategies to minimize the potential
adverse effects of investigator bias and unwarranted selectivity in the use of materials from
the historical record. Principally, I sought to cross-reference and triangulate with various
sources of evidence so as to maximize coverage and bring to light inaccuracies or biases in
the individual sources, in the process constructing a more accurate account (McCullagh,
2000; Thies 2002). For example, to avoid the problems associated with interview data, e.g.,
analyzing or describing the past from the viewpoint of the present (Butterfield, 1931; Thies,
2002) or interpreting interviewee accounts in favor of the way they saw events, I sought to
triangulate with other sources of evidence – e.g., archives, newspaper and other
contemporaneous accounts – so as to minimize inconsistencies, inaccuracies or biases in
these individual sources and ultimately provide a more accurate account.

Equally,

concerning secondary sources, I followed Thies (2002) recommendation to start with the
most recent contributions and then work backwards, the aim being to note the ‘facts’ that
have stood the test of time.
In the knowledge that the record was incomplete, I am inclined towards viewing the
‘results [of my research] as the uncertain product of an incomplete evidentiary record’
(Elman and Elman, 2001: 29).

Compounding this problem, the primary and secondary

sources available to me were still too large to consider on my own, thus necessitating yet
more selectivity in the sources I used. As such, I acknowledge the potential impact of this
selectivity on the judgments or inferences I have made.
Methodologically, path dependence entails ‘tracing a given outcome back to a
particular set of historical events, and showing how these events are themselves contingent
occurrences that cannot be explained on the basis of prior historical conditions’ (Mahoney,
2000: 507-508).

With path dependence characterizing ‘specifically those historical

sequences in which contingent events set into motion…event chains that have deterministic
properties’ (Mahoney, 2000: 507), narrative analysis is considered most useful ‘when
temporal sequencing, particular events, and path dependence must be taken into account’
(Mahoney, 1999: 1164). Narratives have an explicit start point, a sequence of intervening
events, and an end point that is reached through the many paths and the interrelationships
between the intervening events (Griffin, 1992). A narrative explanation depends on these
unfurling interconnections to explore the process leading to the outcome under investigation.
As the story develops, there are contingencies, conjunctions and paths to be considered that
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might change the general flow of the narrative. As such, narrative explanation has to absorb
the order of events and the position of an event in the story (Gotham and Staples, 1996).
Having a coherent story line, it becomes possible to explain events at one point in
time with reference to previous developments in the plot. Thus it is that the researcher-asstoryteller comes to identify the inherent logic that causes one event to follow from another
(Abbott, 1992; Griffin, 1993; Isaac, 1997). Approaching explanation through storytelling
provides what is considered a good way to represent how causal relations are rooted in
particular contexts and performed over time (Haydu, 1998). However, narrative alone does
not provide causal explanations of path-dependent processes for, as Griffin (1993) notes,
chronological order does not automatically yield causal significance. Further, on its own,
narrative description can obscure explanation through its inability to recognize that an event
may not have impact until much later in a sequence of events (Griffin, 1993).
Approaching path dependence through the narrative method of event structure
analysis (Corsaro and Heise, 1990; Griffin, 1993; Heise, 1991; Isaac, Street and Knapp,
1994), and its associated computer program ETHNO (Heise, 2007), offers a rigorous
systematic method for analyzing narrative that helps the analyst extract a causal
interpretation.

A heuristic methodology using an inferential, disciplined, non-probabilistic

and replicable logic (Griffin and Ragin, 1994), event structure analysis overcomes problems
associated with introducing theoretical assumptions into accounts, neglecting causal
connections or wrongly assessing the relative influence of causal factors into narrative
construction (Griffin, 1992, 1993).
Thus, having constructed the running chronology of events that constitute the
organizational forming sequence for the IDA, I then used the ETHNO program to help me
develop my interpretation of the causal relationships, the path dependencies, and the critical
points in the IDA’s creation, reproduction and disruption. I entered each event into the
ETHNO program in chronological order and, as each new event was entered, ETHNO posed
a series of ‘yes/no’ questions to me that asked for clarification about whether an event
entered earlier was necessary for the occurrence of this new event. Through this process of
interrogation, I was able to break down the running chronology of the narrative and
reconstruct it with causal connections based on my ‘expert judgments’ (Griffin, 1993).
ETHNO, it has to be said, does not determine causality. Rather, I structured and
interpreted the narrative events, based on information and knowledge I had to hand (Griffin,
1993, Isaac, Street and Knapp, 1994). Through the use of ‘yes/no’ queries, ETHNO obliged
me to be clear-cut and thorough in my assessments about the association between particular
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events and to evaluate these events causally, not chronologically (Griffin, 1993).

The

heuristic of event structure analysis, and its associated ETHNO tool, allowed me to hone my
understanding of the causal relationships between the different events. In so doing, I was in a
position to verify which events had no effect and how certain events had consequences for
the future even though they did not trigger anything in the present. With the help of ETHNO,
I decomposed the IDA’s creation, reproduction and disruption into a series of events such
that path dependencies were identified and made clear. Figure 2 below presents a sample
ETHNO output showing associations between a series of events.

------------------------------Insert Figure 2 about here
-------------------------------

ORGANIZATIONAL PATH DEPENDENCE – IRELAND’S INDUSTRIAL
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Taking path dependence as lens, we now move on to trace the emergence and evolution of
the IDA. The story that unfolds takes as its starting point Ireland’s turn to protectionism
following the general election of 1932, charting the increasing investment by successive
Governments in the machinery of protection and the critical juncture that marked the creation
of the IDA in 1949 as an autonomous agency within an institutional matrix focused on
protection. The story then moves on to tell of the gradual shift away from protection towards
free trade, a repositioning that witnessed the lock-in of the IDA as the pre-eminent agency of
state dealing with industrial development. Throughout the course of time, the story traces the
growing commitment to the IDA in terms of political, institutional and monetary resources,
with the IDA in turn reinforcing that commitment through delivery on its objectives, largely
in the shape of new job creation. Essentially, the story is illustrative of increasing returns
reinforcing the chosen path of industrial development, itself reinforcing the IDA as the
principal instrument through which such development occurs.

However, as the story

continues to unfold, the increasing reliance on foreign investment to meet targets, at the
expense of indigenous industry, eventually surfaces as a challenge to the IDA in the early
1980s and culminates in the path-breaking event that sees the IDA being split into separate
agencies in 1994.
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Phase I – Emerging within Protectionism: Creating the IDA (1949-1950)
With a sluggish economy, the Great Depression in train and economic nationalism on the
rise, two possible paths to economic development were on the table at the time of the 1932
Irish general election, namely, free trade or protectionism. With the protectionist platform
winning the day, the new government embarked on a path that continued in force for almost
two and a half decades, underpinned by Fianna Fáil1, the party advocating protectionism,
winning five successive general elections and remaining in power for almost two decades.
By the late 1940s, the institution of protectionism was coming under pressure because
of its inefficiency, the saturated domestic market, migration from the land, increasing
unemployment and emigration, and a deteriorating balance of payments. While continuing
with the policy of protectionism, a new inter-party government, formed following the 1948
general election, sought to combat its ills through engaging a more proactive industrial policy
centered in a new organization, the IDA. In establishing the IDA in 1949, the government
chose between establishing an autonomous industrial development body and the existing civil
service arrangements and laissez faire policy that left industrial development to the
industrialists themselves, opting for the former and investing in a path to bring about its
creation.

That path involved high set-up costs, not to mention adaptive expectations,

entailing negotiating the proposal within government and the civil service and then selling the
idea to the media, to industrialists, to members of the coalition parties and to party faithful. It
entailed recruiting the Authority members and establishing the IDA as an administrative body
in advance of any legislation passing through the Oireachtas2, itself a large investment should
the initiative have failed in its passage through the legislative process at any of the formal
veto points.

It entailed drafting legislation and steering passage of same through the

legislative process, with succeeding stages dependent on passage of preceding stages first.
Indeed, in proposing legislation to the Oireachtas, government had to be sure that it would
have the support of its own members to ensure safe passage, whatever about the position
taken by the opposition.

Phase II – From Relative Openness to Lock-in: Building the IDA (1950 to 1970)
Thus, even before coming to the Oireachtas, there were already significant start-up costs and
expectations as to what the IDA would achieve. Such was the investment that, on returning
to power in 1951 once again, rather than abolish the IDA as it had threatened to do, Fianna
1
2

Political party formed in 1926 with a republican ethos. Translated as ‘Soldiers of Destiny’.
The Irish legislature, which comprises the Dáil (lower house of parliament) and the Seanad (senate).
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Fáil refocused the IDA instead on industrial development, taking away the administrative role
that was properly seen to rest with civil servants and freeing it to focus on promoting
industrial development. Following this move, the IDA had become established as part of the
nascent industrial development institutional landscape.
The IDA represented layering, in the sense that the protectionist institutional matrix
was left in place, and this layer, while an attempt to improve matters, represented learning
effects and further investment, by way of coordination effects and adaptive expectations, in
making protectionism work. Thus, from 1932, there was built an interdependent institutional
matrix in support of protectionism, resulting in quite substantial complementarities, with
institutional arrangements mutually reinforcing each other.

In essence, institutional

arrangements constituted a stable equilibrium, its resilience being such that institutional
continuity conditioned change and exhibited strong tendencies towards only incremental
adjustment (Pierson, 2004).
A critical feature of path dependent processes is the relative ‘openness’ or
‘permissiveness’ of early stages in a sequence compared with the relatively ‘closed’ or
‘coercive’ nature of later stages (Abbott, 1997; Mahoney, 2001). Initially, the IDA favored
protectionism to encourage indigenous industrial development. However, through experience
on the ground, the IDA’s view gradually changed to seeing export-led industrialization as the
only way to develop the Irish economy and foreign investment as a source for such
industrialization, resulting in its recommendation that the restrictions on foreign capital be
eased (Walsh, 1983, cited in Girvin, 1989: 180-181). The government, in extending the remit
of the IDA, began to actively encourage foreign investment to fill gaps where indigenous
industry had failed to seize opportunities. Subsequently, further modifications were made to
facilitate foreign investment, with industrial policy moving from a focus on importsubstitution and indigenous industry to encouraging exports and foreign investment. Thus,
reflective of learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive expectations, we see a
growing shift in policy, itself requiring the investment of political capital in articulating,
supporting and institutionalizing that shift.
Following North (1990: 98-99), therefore, the continuity of protectionism was not
inevitable given that the mechanisms of reproduction were subsequently eroded over the
course of the reactive process that paved the way for the emergence of a new equilibrium.
Throughout the late 1940s and the 1950s, the decreasing returns to the protectionist path,
when combined with the effects of population movement, began to erode the mechanisms of
reproduction that generated its continuity. While government sought to bolster protectionism
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with mechanisms that included new state organizations (e.g., the IDA, 1949; Córas Tráchtála
Teoranta (Irish Trade Board), 1951; An Foras Tionscail (Industry Board), 1952) and
incentives (e.g., capital and training grants, tax relief on exports) to promote industrial
development, this was insufficient to address the decreasing returns.

Of interest is that

institutional responses in support of protectionism, to include the nascent IDA, proved plastic
enough to fit with an outward-looking reactive process and institutional matrix developing in
parallel, a process driven by the need to deal with new conditions, which included increasing
moves towards free trade and mobile investment capital internationally.
With the rules of the game changing through the 1950s, government was becoming
more frustrated with protectionism in the face of increasing inefficiencies. Despite efforts at
actively encouraging industrial development and the development of exports, the
inefficiencies of the protectionist path were proving immune to such incremental change. It
was only with the government’s path-breaking Programme for Economic Expansion
(Department of Finance, 1958) that all of these moves were pulled together into a coherent
policy of outward-looking economic development, underpinned by industrial development
that embraced export-oriented, foreign direct investment (FDI).

In marking a critical

juncture, this program represented a significant, path-shifting investment on the part of
government in a highly visible policy that effectively sounded the death knell for
protectionism.
Essentially, the move towards a more outward-looking economic development policy
entailed considerable start-up costs, particularly political and particularly for Fianna Fáil,
which had preached protectionism for three decades. Representing a fundamental shift in
policy, government had to both divest itself of protectionism and embrace a more open policy
that included accepting foreign investment as a vehicle through which to achieve both
industrial and economic development. Further, it meant government investing in promoting
this highly visible policy change, investing in the creation of new meaning around the new
policy and investing in its implementation. It meant considerable start-up costs for the civil
service in reorienting itself away from managing protectionism to putting in place new
institutions to manage a more open economy. It also meant investing in engagement with
ongoing moves internationally towards freer trade and the changes such engagement would
require, such as the development of complementary policies, the negotiation and signing of
treaties, and the implementation of these treaties.

Further, it meant investment in the

development, promotion and implementation of successor economic development plans that
built on, and so reinforced, the path established by the critical juncture. Equally, these
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investments were not just monetary, but they were also in reorienting the collective mindset,
disengaging it from the policy of the past and engaging it with the policy of the future.
The government’s main objective in terms of industrial policy was to create the
conditions necessary for private enterprise to drive industrial development. Thus, in terms of
adaptive expectations, we see it explicitly expressed as part of government policy that
protection is increasingly untenable in a world that is sensed to be moving towards free trade
and in opposition to an industrial development policy that both welcomes foreign
participation and is export-oriented.

This new approach to economic development

established the path to be followed and, it is in line with this critical juncture, that moves
along the path of export-led industrialization and economic cooperation with Europe were
subsequently made.
The policy change favoring free trade reinforced the IDA’s efforts in positioning itself
as the focal organization to attract FDI, effectively turning it into an investment promotion
agency, with coordination effects and adaptive expectations seeing increases in the
organization’s scope and resources through the success of its efforts.

In the years

immediately following, and illustrative of learning effects, coordination effects and adaptive
expectations, the IDA invested in marketing campaigns and opened offices in the US and
Europe, which garnered foreign investment for the country, such investment garnering further
funding for the IDA to facilitate its work, each move reinforcing further moves along the
burgeoning path of FDI as a means of achieving industrial development.

In terms of

complimentary institutional developments, besides the financial incentives machinery, other
legislative moves complemented and facilitated the IDA’s work, particularly in the area of
taxation. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the IDA gradually built the country’s reputation as a
base for manufacturing industry and its reputation and identity as the country’s industrial
development organization. This period acted as the ‘pilot stage’ in attracting new industries
to the country, albeit the pilot provided much of the manufacturing sector’s diversification
and growth (O’Neill, 1972: 44).
The IDA’s success met with operational limitations, however. As matters stood, the
IDA operated within the tight constraints of the civil service bureaucracy, with no control
over the assignment or withdrawal of its staff, nor over its structure. On the one hand, the
IDA was being asked to play an increasingly demanding, key role in the country’s economic
development, while being handicapped on the other through not having the operational
autonomy to deliver on that role. To bring about change, the IDA engaged US consultants
Arthur D. Little (Little, 1967a, b) to assist it in a major reappraisal of Ireland’s industrial
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development apparatus.

The review concluded that achieving full employment rested on

encouraging foreign firms to establish operations in the country, requiring more than just
charging the IDA with the undertaking; the IDA would also need far greater resources than
were given it, in addition to the capacity and flexibility to control its own operations.

Phase III – Lock-in: Consolidating the IDA (1970 to 1982)
On foot of the Little (1967a, b), National Industrial Economic Council (1968) and Public
Services Organisation Review Group (1969) reviews, and by way of lock-in, new legislation,
enacted in 1969, streamlined agencies dealing with industrial development and concentrated
the expertise within an expanded IDA having full control over its own internal operations. It
gave the IDA the status of a state-sponsored organization having national responsibility for
the furtherance of industrial development, in addition to consolidating decision-making
power concerning industrial development within the organization. Government maintained
overall control through its power to appoint the IDA’s members, its broad responsibility for
setting industrial policy and its broad control over the organization’s budget. Additionally,
government pro-actively legitimized the IDA’s role and position, making it clear through the
reorganization legislation that both industrial development and the IDA’s central role in it
represented a vital, long-term program for Ireland to which it was committed.
Having invested considerable set-up costs in re-creating the IDA, in terms of, for
example, consultants reports, political capital, legislation and dissolution of agencies, the new
IDA came into being as a state-sponsored body on April 1st, 1970. From enactment of the
establishing legislation there followed considerable investment in a highly specific asset,
namely an autonomous industrial development organization, which entailed physical
specificity (e.g., the IDA as an industrial development organization, industrial development
legislation, policies and programs, party political platforms on industrial development, all of
which involved design characteristics particular to industrial development), human specificity
(e.g., the IDA’s specialized knowledge of the industrial development environment resulting
from learning-by-doing, and its special relationships with various actors resulting from
repeated interactions with these actors) and dedicated assets, where the value of all assets
derived from continuance of industrial development to which they were applied (Pierson,
2004).
Now vested with the formulation and implementation of national and regional
industrial policy and freed from the shackles of the civil service to manage its own affairs, the
IDA put in place systems, structures and institutional arrangements that have persisted over
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time. Re-creating the IDA entailed introducing a new organization structure and meeting its
expanded mandate saw the organization engage in a major recruitment drive.

In seeing

industrial development as a ‘cooperative process’, requiring the participation of a range of
development organizations, the IDA from early on saw value in building contacts throughout
the country and devoted significant staff resources to managing them through representations
of key personnel on a range of main boards, committees and organizations. It also decided to
carry out many of its executive functions through committees, with delegated grant giving
powers, on which other interests participated, e.g., the Confederation of Irish Industry, the
Irish Export Board, research institutes, universities and government departments.
The new IDA also invested in creating a Janus-faced organization, with one face
managing the needs of and relationship with industry and the other face managing the needs
of and relationship with government, very much placing the IDA itself in the position of a
coordinating mechanism, the benefits of its activities being enhanced through coordinating
with the activities of both government and industrial investors.

Having the ear of

government, the IDA was active in generating further complementarities with other policy
areas, such as education and physical infrastructure. As the increasingly credible experts, the
IDA was in the unique position of being able to say to government what was needed to
facilitate and encourage industrial development and the delivery of new jobs, such that
government listened and acted accordingly. Arguably, the IDA was able to use its position to
generate increasing complementarities thereby increasing its value and reinforcing its own
position.
Building on the learning since promotional activity commenced in 1955, the new IDA
adopted a more intensive and focused method of promotion encompassing a more selective
approach, direct marketing, advertising and public relations. For the IDA, this research-based
promotional program proved an effective tool in targeting its limited resources at foreign
companies that were looking to expand abroad and that met Ireland’s industrial development
needs (IDA Annual Report, 1971/72: 20).

In effect, and revealing learning effects and

adaptive expectations in refining a strategy it had pursued since the 1960s, the IDA went
about attracting leading companies in the field, a strategy that contributed to increasing
returns in the spatial location of production (Arthur, 1994; Krugman, 1991).

These

companies, in turn, attracted suppliers, skilled labor, specialized services and appropriate
infrastructure, and contributed to the development of social networks, which facilitated the
exchange of information and expertise. Further, the presence of these companies and the
concentration of these factors contributed to Ireland’s attractiveness for other firms in the
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sector, in effect, acting like magnets and influencing the locational decisions and investments
of these other companies.
Thus, working from within the constrained choice-set presented by the chosen path to
achieving industrial development, namely the active sourcing of foreign investment to create
sustainable jobs (McLoughlin, 1972: 35), the IDA, on the back of a strong planning process
and cognizant of its limited resources, prioritized industrial sectors and targeted leading
companies that the organization expected would deliver a high national economic and social
benefit into the future.

In essence, and building on the learning gained from its earlier

promotional efforts in using leading companies to attract others, coordination effects and
adaptive expectations came into play in adopting this selective, targeted approach, with
success over time reinforcing the approach such that it became self-fulfilling. That is, the
approach delivered investment and jobs, which reinforced continued investment in the
approach, which delivered further investment and jobs as agglomeration effects came into
play, with the winning companies attracting investment from others in the sector, this positive
feedback itself reinforcing the value of the IDA as an industrial development organization,
especially when set against the poor performance of indigenous industry.
By way of delivering results for government, and also by way of focusing the
organization on its mandate, the IDA instituted a highly quantified approach new to state
agencies at the time, namely annual targets for the creation of jobs, which were made public
in advance and subsequently reported on so that the organization could be seen to be
performing in delivering results (MacSharry and White, 2000: 194). These highly visible
performance measures served to reinforce the chosen path to industrial development, with
achievement of targets being evidence to government and the public that the IDA were
delivering results, which encouraged continued investment in the IDA, in turn delivering on
targets and so on. Such were the coordination effects afforded by the IDA in terms of job
creation that, in tandem with learning effects and adaptive expectations, the organization’s
requests for exchequer funding, for both incentives and administration, were invariably
looked upon favorably.
In terms of program development (e.g., Re-equipment and Modernization, Product
and

Process

Development,

Service

Industries,

Project

Identification,

Enterprise

Development), the IDA’s programs are illustrative of the learning-by-doing that occurred
over time and that served to consolidate its position as the national industrial development
organization.

All are indicative of its capacity to learn and to innovate, in the process

ensuring its continued relevance as the focal point in coordinating industrial development
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policy formulation and implementation. Effectively, over time, the IDA developed programs
suited to the particular industrial development challenges it faced, illustrating that a
significant amount of learning-by-doing had occurred in the increasingly complex industrial
development system.
While the 1950s and 1960s were about building and consolidating the IDA’s identity,
credibility and legitimacy, following the lock-in that consolidated the IDA as a statesponsored body, the 1970s was a period of building the organizational form and further
consolidating the organization’s credibility and legitimacy. The decade was capped by a
progress report (IDA Annual Report, 1979: 3-4) citing a litany of achievements, including an
expanded, autonomous organization employing almost 700 highly skilled staff, client
company investment of £2.7bn (compared to £130m in the 1960s) for a total grant
commitment of £831m and job approvals of 192,000 (compared to 45,500 for the 1960s),
with 99,000 in domestic industry. To all intents and purposes, it appeared as though the
significant investment of resources in the IDA, allied with its own learning and the increased
coordination of policies and activities to fit with its interests, was delivering according to
expectations, this positive feedback reinforcing the IDA as an organizational form. However,
from the relative glory of the 1970s, the IDA moved to more challenging times in the 1980s.

Phase IV – Reactive Process: From State-Sponsored Super-Agency to Agency Focused
on FDI (1982-1994)
From a path dependence perspective, the story moves from one of lock-in to a reactive
process that culminates in a path-breaking event leading to the reorganization of the IDA.
According to Wickham (1983), Ireland’s success in attracting FDI lay in the very particular
situation of the IDA. As has already been noted, the organization was effectively the sole
industrial development body in the country: it had, to this point, remained unchallenged by
any power center either in the country or outside it; it was shielded from political interference
that would have impacted both policy formulation and implementation; its ‘discretionary’
decision-making was suited to dealing with private enterprise; and it was in a position to
legitimate itself to all stakeholders as fulfilling an important national task.
Though Wickham’s observation points to success with foreign investment, concerns
gradually emerged throughout the 1970s about an over-reliance on such investment and its
tenuous links with the economy, not to mention a dualistic industrial structure and the
influence of external interests on national sovereignty (e.g., Cooper and Whelan, 1973;
Jacobsen, 1978; Kennedy and Dowling, 1975; Long, 1976; The Economist, 1977). These
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concerns led the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) to commission a five-part
review to ensure that government industrial policy was suited to creating an internationally
competitive industrial base in Ireland.
One of the reviews, Telesis (1982), had the greatest impact of all in regard to the IDA
and to industrial development policy. Having experienced a decade of relative glory through
the 1970s, Telesis brought the IDA’s legitimacy into question at a time when the country was
experiencing the effects of a global recession, a poor foreign investment climate, mounting
domestic economic problems and increasing unemployment (IDA Annual Reports, 1980-83;
MacSharry and White, 2000; Telesis, 1982).
In assessing Ireland’s then industrial policy, Telesis was complimentary on a number
of fronts. It considered that the country had a clearly articulated, very advanced, extensive
and consistent industrial policy, with inventive and energetic state agencies devising
programs to deliver on policy goals.

With particular reference to the IDA, the review

observed that it had succeeded in developing what was arguably the most dynamic, active,
efficient and effective organization of its kind in the world, with a well-earned reputation as
the leading organization in the field.
However, the review also noted weaknesses in industrial policy had contributed to
weaknesses in the country’s industrial structure, thus limiting the success of the country’s
industrial development. The review’s main criticism was that industrial development had
largely depended on FDI, while indigenous industry languished. It criticized the practice of
creating and counting job approvals over the creation and counting of actual jobs delivered,
commenting that, while there was value politically to government and motivationally to the
IDA in touting job approval targets, the gap between approval and reality had the effect of
creating expectations in the general population that were then not met.

And from a

governance perspective, it noted that, legally, government departments were responsible for
determining strategy with the IDA responsible for strategy implementation, whereas the
reality was that the IDA formulated strategy in line with its job creation mandate, while
government departments were both lacking in staff numbers and information sufficient to
formulate strategy and oversee the implementation of this strategy by the IDA.
The overall impact of Telesis was to refine both the IDA and industrial development
policy.

Changes were bounded and incremental, with the IDA still very much the lead

industrial development organization. The outcome of Telesis and the debate it engendered
was the setting of an adjusted course, building on past success and reflecting the lessons
learned from experience gained to that point. In many respects, given the complexity of the
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problems it confronted, i.e., a worsening fiscal crisis and increasing unemployment,
government relied heavily on the pre-existing industrial development policy and
organizational framework, adjusting at the margins to accommodate the demands of the
situation (Pierson, 1993). The above tallies with Hall’s (1989: 11) proposition that ‘prior
experience with related policies’ is such that ‘states will be predisposed towards policies with
which they already have some favourable experience.’
While the exogenous shocks of the early 1980s engendered an industrial policy
debate, the result was on-path responses entailing layering onto the existing industrial
development institution.

The IDA remained the focal organization, foreign investment

remained an important source for jobs and greater attention was now to be paid to indigenous
industry, with the IDA and government coalescing around this on-path response through their
collective effort at articulating an industrial development policy that validated the approach
taken over the preceding decades and that acknowledged the learning accruing that facilitated
incremental change.

It was not a case that the IDA had not been doing anything with

indigenous industry; rather, collective learning suggested it needed to invest more into what it
was already doing.
With Telesis still very much in the background, the late 1980s witnessed a number of
threats to the IDA in terms of its position as the central industrial development organization
(MacSharry and White, 2000: 212), while the early 1990s witnessed yet another review of
industrial policy with major ramifications for the IDA (Department of Enterprise, 1993;
Industrial Policy Review Group, 1992). Representing a critical juncture, the outcome of the
review saw the Department of Industry and Commerce reclaim the role of determining
industrial policy and of supervising its implementation from the IDA, which was split into
three separate organizations.
Thus it was that the policy refocus recommended from Telesis onwards found
subsequent expression in the formal recreation of the IDA as three separate, autonomous
bodies in January, 1994, each with its own board and its own distinct mission and goals. All
three agencies operate within a framework which facilitates cooperation and mutual support,
with Forfás, the umbrella agency, focusing on policy, Forbairt (now Enterprise Ireland)
charged with promoting indigenous industry and IDA-Ireland responsible for attracting FDI
to Ireland.
From the relative success of the 1970s, the IDA entered the 1980s under a cloud
created by the Telesis (1982) review, which was exacerbated by the poor economic and jobs
climate throughout the decade. The lock-in that marked the 1970s gave way to a reactive
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process that saw both questioning of the IDA and the mechanisms generating its continuity,
finding subsequent expression in the path-breaking event that brought about recreation of the
IDA.
From a path dependence perspective, arguably, the change to the IDA as an industrial
development organization remains within the bounds of the FDI path being pursued since the
1950s. What has transpired in the interim is that much policy learning and organizational
learning has ensued, such that the state continued to invest in refining its industrial
development policy and the institutional and organizational arrangements established in
support of that policy. The IDA of 1955 has continued on through to the IDA-Ireland of
today, in terms of its sole focus on promoting internationally mobile investment by foreign
interests in Ireland. The IDA that emerged from the late 1960s incorporating indigenous
along with foreign industry was subsequently renegotiated in the early 1990s, such that the
organizational structure that existed internally was externalized through the creation of
separate agencies out of the existing divisional structure.

IN CONCLUSION… A PATH DEPENDENCE PICTURE OF
ORGANIZATIONAL EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION
Taking all of the above together, what emerges is a path dependence picture of the IDA’s
creation within the context of a protectionist path, and subsequent production and
reproduction within the context of a free trade path. We see the critical junctures marking the
turn to protectionism and then to free trade, in addition to the critical juncture marking the
IDA’s establishment, then its focus on development of new industry and re-focus on FDI,
followed by its lock-in as a super-agency with national responsibility for all aspects of
industrial development policy and implementation, and, most recently, the path-breaking
event that saw it re-focused on FDI, with its responsibility for policy development and
indigenous industry centered in separate, new agencies.
Post-critical junctures, positive feedback mechanisms come into play to produce and
reproduce the chosen path, culminating in lock-in.

We see such large set-up costs and

investment going into the IDA, producing and reproducing an increasingly specific industrial
development asset. Tremendous amounts of learning by doing has occurred in what has
increasingly become a complex system, with the IDA developing strategies suited to the
particular institutional matrix it has confronted. We see widespread coordination effects,
with particular courses of action encouraged, and others discouraged, given the anticipated
actions of others within the industrial development sphere. We see growing complementarity
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between the outward-looking policy of economic development and the IDA as the
increasingly focal organization delivering on the country’s industrial development.
Coevolving over an extended period of time, the interactions between the two have created
densely linked institutional matrices (North, 1990). However, we also see that the IDA’s
path has not continued indefinitely, but was disturbed. The reactive process that began with
the Telesis review and culminated in the re-creation of the IDA as three separate agencies
reflected ongoing debate over the needs of foreign and indigenous investors, the scope of
industrial policy and the division and location of policy development and policy
implementation responsibility.
In the final analysis, from relatively contingent and unpredictable beginnings have
coevolved both an institution and an organizational form. In the case of the IDA, both the
forces for structural persistence and those of reactive processes have contributed to producing
and reproducing an increasingly fine-tuned, specific asset, an organizational form that, ex
ante, could not have been predicted when it was first established. In other words, telling the
story of the IDA from a path dependence perspective allows for engagement with history and
process, in so doing maintaining an opening toward organizational forming in organizational
theorizing and research.
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Figure 1: Analytic Structure of Path-dependent Explanation – adapted from Sydow, Schreyögg and Koch (2009: 692) and Mahoney (2001: 113).
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Figure 2 – Sample ETHNO output showing associations between a series of events.
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